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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Felony Murder-Homicide by Fright
X, in committing armed robbery of a tavern, fires a warning
shot into the ceiling to show he means business. Y, a customer in
the tavern and one of the intended victims, has a heart attack and
dies. May X be convicted of first degree murder? In State v.
McKeiver,1 a New Jersey Superior Court, applying its felony-
murder statute,2 held that this situation was sufficient to support
an indictment for first degree murder. This note will attempt to
examine the felony-murder rule, its purpose and the validity of
this extended application.
At common law the felony-murder rule was simply that a homi-
cide resulting from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a
felony was designated as murder.' Today, the rule, as generally
codified in this country, is that a murder4 committed in the perpetra-
tion or the attempted perpetration of one of the "dangerous"
felonies5 designated by statute is a first degree offense.' There are
'89 N.J. Super. 52, 213 A.2d 320 (Super. Ct. 1965). This case has
now been terminated as the State has accepted a plea to manslaughter."Murder which ... is committed in perpetrating or attempting to per-
petrate arson, burglary, kidnaping, rape, robbery or sodomy, is murder in
the first degree ... ." N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1953).
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 57-59 (1881).
' Twenty-seven jurisdictions require this "murder" threshold. ARiz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-452 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2205 (1964); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 189; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-3 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 53-9 (Supp. 1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 571 (Supp.
1964); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4003 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. § 690.2
(1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 21-401 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 410 (Supp. 1965); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 265, § 1 (1956); Micir. STAT.
ANN. § 28.548 (1954); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.010 (1953); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. § 94-2503 (1949); NEV. REv. STAT. § 200.030 (1957); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 585:1 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:113-2 (1953);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-2-1 (1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-12 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963);
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-23-1 (1957); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2402
(1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-30-3 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
2301 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-21 (Supp. 1964); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 5916 (1961). Other jurisdictions give the felony-murder rule a broader
coverage by designating as a first degree offense (a) "every homicide" com-
mitted during a dangerous felony, ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 314 (1959), or (b)"every unlawful killing" during a dangerous felony, see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 782.04 (1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3401 (1956); N.Y. PEN. §
1044; ORE. REv. STAT. § 163.010 (1963); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.48.030
(1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (1959).
Felony murder is considered a first degree offense in thirty-six Ameri-
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two elements of felony murder: (1) the defendant must commit
or attempt to commit a "dangerous" felony, and (2) the defendant
must commit a murder. The second element generally requires
malice and causation. Upon proof of these elements the state estab-
lishes a first degree murder charge.
The first element is a limitation imposed by the purpose of the
rule-the prevention of the unintended, unpremeditated and some-
times accidental deaths that too often occur in the perpetration of
certain felonies.' Since the common characteristic of these "danger-
ous" felonies is the creation of a substantial risk to human life, the
first element is also important in establishing the second. Malice
aforethought must be exhibited by a defendant in order to charge
him with murder. This vague term was at first nothing more
definite than a general intention to commit a wrong," but it is now
considered an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated man-en-
dangering-state-of-mind.' This requisite mental state may be either
express or implied, and because of the common characteristic of a
"dangerous" felony, the courts will normally imply malice from the
felon's actions. It has been said that
this imputation is justifiable only on the assumption that the risk
of death or serious bodily harm as a consequence of a felony, or
the risk in concert with the felonious intent, is sufficient to imply
malice on the ground that the felon demonstrates that he has no
concern for human life.
10
This does not mean, however, that the malice with which a "danger-
ous" felony is committed will always satisfy the murder require-
ment of the felony-murder rule, because the rule allows only malice
can jurisdictions recognizing two degrees of murder. 66 YALE L.J. 427 n.1
(1957).
o The "dangerous" felony requirement was the earliest restriction on the
application of the felony-murder rule. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky.
386, 63 S.W. 976 (1901); People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373
(1924). The usual felonies designated today are arson, burglary, rape and
robbery. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953) contains the language "or other
felony" and it is still an open question whether any statutory felony or
only a felony dangerous to life is intended. State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301,
56 S.E.2d 649 (1949).
7 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 37 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959); REPORT OF RoYAL CoMmissioN ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, CMD.
No. 8932, at 35-36 (1949-53).
866 YALE L.J. 427, 430 (1957).
'Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537
(1934)." 71 HARv. L. REv. 1565 (1958).
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and not the act of killing to be imputed to the felon. Causation
must still be proved." This should be only "but for" causation-a
negative concept that unless the felony causes the death, no murder
is committed.' Although there is judicial authority to the con-
trary,' 3 the recent trend of decisions is to reject an affirmative
application of proximate cause. Because of this rejection, a defen-
dant is not guilty of felony murder for justifiable homicide by a
policeman or excusable homicide by a victim committed during the
course of the defendant's felony.'4 Thus the mere coincidence of
homicide and felony is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
the felony-murder rule.
The establishment of these elements enables the court and the
jury to impose the severest penalty allowed by the state; this is the
real significance of the felony-murder rule. It is not the imposition
of criminal responsibility that should be criticized but rather the
degree of responsibility the rule demands. The degree of responsi-
bility was of little consequence at common law because all felonies
were punishable by death.'" But with the curtailment of capital
punishment and the division of murder, its continued characteriza-
tion as a first degree offense is of great importance. At common
law, malice aforethought was the only requirement for murder, as
it is for second degree murder today. First degree murder, to the
layman, has the additional requirement of wilful, premeditated and
deliberate action.'6 The felony-murder rule, however, relieves the
state of the difficult burden of proving this mental state characterized
by a design to kill. By eliminating inquiry into whether such design
exists,' 7 the rule greatly expands the application of first degree
1 5 SANTA CLARA LAW. 172, 176 (1964).
"2 34 N.C.L. REV. 350, 353 (1956).
"3Ludwig, Foreseeable Death in Felony Murder, 18 U. PiTr. L. REV.
51 (1956)."4People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 (1965) (dis-
approving any inconsistency in People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330,
1 Cal. Rptr. 414 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Commonwealth v. Redline, 391
Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958) (overruling Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382
Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955)).1 James, The Felony Murder Doctrine, 1 Am. CRIM. L.Q. 33, 37 (1963).
1 66 YALE L.J. 427, 432-33 (1957).
' When a homicide is committed during a robbery, premeditation is not
an element, robbery being the legal equivalent thereof. State v. Akins, 94
Ariz. 263, 383 P.2d 180 (1963). Affirmative defenses to the specific intent
to kill also have no validity. E.g., United States ex rel. Rucker v. Myers,
311 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1962) (intoxication); State v. Pastet, 152 Conn. 81,
203 A.2d 287 (1964) (temporary insanity).
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murder and places at the disposal of law enforcement officials a
formidable weapon. Of course, it is evident that in many instances
the felon deserves the severest penalty allowed by law, as where a
robber kills his victim to prevent identification. Such punishment
could be obtained by a straight first degree murder indictment with-
out the support of the felony-murder rule. In absence of facts
establishing a wilful, premeditated and deliberate killing, as in the
principal case, the maximum offense, theoretically justifiable, would
be second degree murder. Moreover, in the rare case where
the chances of death resulting from the commission of the felonious
act is so remote that no reasonable man would have taken it into
account, only a manslaughter conviction should be sustained.'" Al-
though it is foreseeable in the perpetration of armed robbery that
violence may erupt causing death, it is arguable that in the principal
case death by heart attack is not foreseeable.' Even if the state
is able to establish factual causation through medical evidence and
the "thin skull" doctrine,20 the real question of whether liability
should attach still remains. "[T]his is a question not of causation
but of culpability. ' 2 ' However, the consideration of whether the
legislature intended to impose this severe penalty on such conduct
is excluded by operation of law, and the homicide is classified as
first degree murder. Professor Packer states that
in form, this means that absolute liability for murder is being
imposed. In substance, however, the felony-murder rule simply
relieves the jury of having to infer what can usually be inferred
with great ease, that the actor foresaw that death might result
from his conduct. The irrationality of the rule, which has long
drawn the attack of scholars, lies in the result that it compels in
'8 Perkins, supra note 9, at 560.
Such an argument is no longer strengthened by the fact that death
was not caused by corporal harm. Today, of course, most jurisdictions
impose criminal responsibility for death from fright resulting from battery
upon the deceased. E.g., Snowden v. State, 133 Md. 624, 106 Atl. 5 (1919) ;
State v. Knight, 247 N.C. 754, 102 S.E.2d 259 (1958). But jurisdictions
also impose such responsibility even though no hostile demonstration or
overt act was directed at the deceased. People v. Studer, 59 Cal. App. 547,
211 Pac. 233 (Dist. Ct. App. 1922); In the Matter of Heigho, 18 Idaho
566, 110 Pac. 1029 (1910); Graves v. Commonwealth, 273 S.W.2d 380
(Ky. 1954) (rev'd on other grounds). For a general discussion of homicide
by fright or shock, see Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 1072 (1956).2 Although this is a tort concept, the idea that one takes his victim as
he finds him may be applicable here.
21 Packer, The Modet Penat Code and Beyond, 63 CoLuM. L. l~v. 594,
603 (1963).
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the rare case in which the evidence shows the absence of culpable
foresight. It is this automatic and conchtsive imputation of cul-
pability that has been rightly criticized.
22
What is the justification for such a special ban? It may be
said to be warranted as vengeance or retribution for fearful harm.
But in those felony homicides lacking the additional requirements
for first degree murder, the community would not demand the most
severe penalty and, in fact, to do so weakens the concept of first
degree murder.23 Most proponents of the felony-murder rule ex-
pound its deterrent effect.24 Even though it can be argued that the
deterrent effect is dubious, it is more important to point out that
mere increase in punishment beyond that provided for the under-
lying felony or warranted by the evidence of culpability is not the
correct method.'
One solution to this problem in any legal system is to abolish the
rule, as England and Ohio have done.26 However, this solution is
undesirable, for it ignores the valuable insight drawn from common
experience that unintended deaths too often occur during certain
felonies. Moreover, abolishing the rule is not necessary. By lower-
ing the degree of criminal responsibility imposed upon the felon,
who unintentionally "causes" a death, a rational basis may be main-
tained in attempting to prevent crime and to preserve human life.
While in the majority of cases, an enactment that embodies the
felon-murder rule within second or third degree murder
27 will
punish the offender according to his state of mind or culpability,
there still remains the rare instance where the remote death occurs
"Id. at 598.
"Morris, The Felon's Responsibility For the Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. tRxv. 50, 66 (1956).2, E.g., People v. Washington, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 447, 402 P.2d 130, 135
(1965) (dissent).
"The efficacy of punishment in preventing crime depends both on
its severity and its certainty. Centuries of common law experience
have demonstrated that certainty of punishment is more effective in
deterring potential offenders than severity. It has also demonstrated
that excessive severity may diminish certainty of punishment. This
is so because the criminal law depends for its enforcement on laymen
as complainants, witnesses and jurors.
Ludwig, supra note 13, at 61-62.
"6English Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11; OHio REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 2901.01, 2901.05 (Page 1958). In the MODEL PENAL COD. § 201.2,
comment 4, at 35-36 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) these two statutes are dis-
cussed in conjunction with the doctrine's rejection or nonexistence in other
foreign countries.
27 See, MINN. STAT. § 609.195 (1964).
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during a felony. Thus the best solution28 appears to be that adopted
in the Model Penal Code."9 The Code provides that homicides oc-
curring in the course of the commission of felonies "will only
constitute murder if they are committed purposely or knowingly, or
recklessly where the recklessness demonstrates extreme indifference
to the value of human life, subject, however, to a presumption of
such recklessness if the actor is committing""° one of the dangerous
felonies normally found in a felony-murder statute. This presump-
tion of extreme recklessness is rebuttable,"' and the jury may find
that the recklessness lacks extreme indifference.82 The homicide,
however, may still be adjudged reckless, in which event it consti-
tutes manslaughter.-3 In this manner, the Code recognizes and cor-
rects the real evil of the felony-murder rule, i.e., the irrelevant issue
of whether the homicide was purposely or accidentally committed. 4
The Code's effect is concisely stated by Professor Packer.
In short, the felony-murder rule is transformed from a rule of
law to a rule of evidence. The principle of wens rea, as it applies
in the law of homicide, is fully preserved, but the jury's atten-
tion is explicitly directed to the justifiable evidentiary implication
of homicide in the course of a felony.35
The results may not often differ,( but a conviction under the Code
would rest upon sound grounds.
Whether the defendant in the McKeiver case could overcome
the presumption of extreme indifference will not be discussed here.
28 One attempt at punishing according to culpability is the declaration
that homicide in the commission or attempted commission of a crime punish-
able by death or life imprisonment is first degree murder. MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 265, § 1 (1956). Another solution that has been suggested is to
increase the penalty for the underlying felony. Morris, supra note 23, at 77.
"If the object of the rule is to prevent such accidents, it should make acci-
dental killing with fire-arms murder, not accidental killing in the effort to
steal; while, if the object is to prevent stealing, it would be better to hang
one thief in every thousand by lot." HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 58 (1881).
" MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 33 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
81 Ibid.
8' MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 2 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
8MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 33 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
1" MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2, comment 4, at 39 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
"Packer, supra note 21, at 599.
The Code declares that murder is a first degree felony which may have
the death sentence. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
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The writer only suggests that to impose first degree murder auto-
matically without inquiry into whether the actor had the requisite
culpability with respect to the result threatens the very foundation
of the criminal law-the principal of punishing according to cul-
pability. If the Code with its firm foundation has not been accepted,
the law enforcement officials must analyze each fact situation and if
necessary, as in the principal case, punish only the justifiable crimes
-armed robbery and manslaughter. The system should not be




In Wofford v. Highway Comm'n, 1 the North Carolina Supreme
Court abolished the doctrine of eminent domain known as the
cul-de-sac principle.2 If a public authority blocks or vacates a por-
tion of a road, leaving any owner whose land abuts the remaining
road without access from one direction, the situation is generally
called a cul-de-sac. In the 1931 decision of Hiatt v. City of Greens-
boro,8 the court held that the creation of a cul-de-sac was compens-
able under eminent domain. 4 The rationale of the court was that
the owner whose property abuts a road has a private easement to
have the street remain open in both directions, and that the damage
to abutting owners was different in kind as well as in degree from
that of the general public. The court stated that the majority of
courts agreed with this view.
Since Hiatt the court has gradually restricted the application of
1263 N.C. 677, 140 S.E.2d 376 (1965).
2 Cul-de-sac is French for "the bottom of a bag." The North Carolina
Supreme Court has defined the cul-de-sac principle as:
The rule that an abutting owner has a right of access to the
general system of streets and to the remainder of his street with all
of its connections to a point where they cease to be of more than
remote advantage to him, and that when one end of the street is closed
he is entitled .to- compensation...... -
Snow v. Highway Comm'n, 262 N.C. 169, 172, 136 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1964).
8201 N.C. 515, 160 S.E. 748 (1931).
'North Carolina has no eminent domain provision in its constitution.
However, just compensation for the taking of private property for public
use has been considered necessary under art. I, § 17 of the North Carolina
Constitution. Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 251 N.C.
531, 112 S.E.2d 111 (1960); Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89
S.E.2d 144 (1955).
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